- Autocracy versus democracy, this week on "Firing Line."

What is the risk of underestimating Putin?

- War in Europe and getting dragged into a war.

- [Hoover] Michael McFaul was US ambassador to Russia from 2012 to 2014.

In Moscow, he met with Russian opposition leaders, which did not endear him to Vladimir Putin.

He is now barred from entering Russia.

- And that's what I worry about.

I worry that if Putin prevails in Ukraine, he won't stop in Ukraine.

- [Hoover] McFaul's new book, "Autocrats vs.

Democrats," argues we have entered a new era of global competition.

- We're going to be in this competition with China and Russia for a long time.

I hope I'm wrong, but I fear I'm right.

- [Hoover] But does President Trump see it the same way?

- [McFaul] President Trump doesn't see the world as a divide between autocrats and democrats.

He sees the world as strong leaders and weak leaders.

And he will engage with the strong leaders irrespective of whether they're autocrats or democrats.

- [Hoover] What does former ambassador Michael McFaul say now?

(dramatic music) - [Announcer] "Firing Line with Margaret Hoover" is made possible in part by Robert Granieri, The Tepper Foundation, Vanessa and Henry Cornell, The Fairweather Foundation, Pritzker Military Foundation, Cliff and Laurel Asness, and by the following.

- Ambassador Michael McFaul, welcome back to "Firing Line."

- Great to be here and great to be here in person.

- You're a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, where I serve on the Board of Overseers, and you have just written a new book, "Autocrats vs.

Democrats," which asserts that the world has entered a new era of great power competition, with the autocrats like China and Russia on one side and the democracies like the United States leading the charge on the other side.

Many have likened this framework to a new Cold War or Cold War II- - Right.

Yes.

- [Hoover] which I know you're familiar with.

- Yeah.

- You have written that that framework distorts more than it illuminates.

- Yeah.

- Why?

- Well, some things are similar, and I go through that in the book, but some things are also different.

Similarities, two superpowers of the world?

Yes.

Two ideologically different kinds of regimes, autocrats versus democrats?

Yes, just like the Cold War.

Do both have international global aspirations, the United States and China?

Yes.

Will it last for decades like the Cold War did?

Tragically, I predict, yes, so similarities are there, but the differences are also important.

One, different from the Soviets and Americans and our economies back in the Cold War, we're intertwined with the Chinese economy.

And the Chinese economy is intertwined with the rest of the world, even if we're not gonna be coupled with them.

That's a big difference.

We got to manage that in a smart way.

But second, big difference in my view, and this is controversial.

I don't think the ideological competition between China and the United States is as intense as it was between the Soviets and the Americans during the Cold War.

Remember, the Soviets were overthrowing regimes.

They were trying to bring communism to the entire world, including the United States of America.

I don't see China and Xi Jinping as that aggressive in this competition.

They're supporting autocrats all over the world, but they're not overthrowing democracies.

But then the third big difference, and I think probably is the biggest and most important one, is about us, America.

So we are more polarized as a society today than we were during the Cold War.

And we are in an isolationist mood in both the Democratic and Republican parties.

There's lots of people in America that just say, "Why do I care about Ukraine?

Why do I care about Taiwan?

Let's just focus on America."

That's different than in the Cold War.

- When you say "we're in an isolationist mood," you actually wrote in the book that Trump returned to the White House in 2025 with an even stronger commitment to an isolationist agenda.

- Yes.

- Nine months in, do you stand by that?

- Well, that's a great question, that's a great question because I had to hurry and finish this book right after he was elected the second time.

- I mean, because we're coming off a week where President Trump is in Asia.

- Yes.

- He's, you know, sitting down with Xi Jinping.

He's in South Korea.

He's hoping to meet with Kim Jong-un, the North Korean leader- - Right, yeah.

- [Hoover] who's testing missiles right now.

- Yes.

- We have engagements around the world in the context of his, you know, interventions in Gaza on behalf of the Israeli hostages.

- Yes.

- The attempts to negotiate peace talks between India and Pakistan, between Cambodia and Thailand.

You know, so Trump has demonstrated- - [McFaul] Yes.

- a degree of interest internationally that doesn't necessarily suggest a posture of isolationism.

- Yeah, I agree.

I agree.

And some of those engagements, especially in the Middle East, that's a fantastic achievement.

The President got those hostages out.

Yes, there's been violations, and that's troublesome in terms of the ceasefire, but that was a great achievement and that was great diplomacy.

I give him a lot of credit for that.

Secondly, I am surprised, because I finished the book at the beginning of the second Trump administration, how engaged he has been in the world.

I did not expect that.

First term was the Trump withdrawal doctrine, right?

He withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership.

He withdrew from the Iran nuclear accord.

He withdrew from Paris climate.

He withdrew from the INF treaty with the Soviets.

Ronald Reagan negotiated that one, by the way.

He said, "We don't need that anymore."

And this is different.

Whether... I think he comes and goes.

He's got these dual impulses.

And most certainly, his party has these dual impulses.

Not everybody in the MAGA movement is excited about all this engagement.

Not everybody is supporting that.

But it's still, I have to say, I am surprised, and I hope it lasts.

- You write in the book, "In the struggle between autocrats and democrats in the 21st century, some have begun to wonder which side the United States is on."

- Yes.

- Which side is the United States on?

- Well, I think the American people and the United States of America, we're on the side of democracy and small-D democrats around the world.

- Yeah.

- I still feel that.

I still see that.

- Yeah.

- But President Trump doesn't see the world as a divide between autocrats and democrats.

He would disagree with the title of my book.

He sees the world as strong leaders and weak leaders.

And he will engage with the strong leaders irrespective of whether they're autocrats or democrats.

- So if the title of your book is "Autocrats vs.

Democrats," which one does Donald Trump represent?

- I still want to believe that at the end of the day, he understands that freedom is better than tyranny, markets are better than communism, democracy is better than dictatorship.

- He is trying to win the Nobel Peace Prize.

- Well, then he should read my book and do more of that.

But let's be honest, he wavers.

He wavers.

And he just shut down a lot of the institutions that used to be effective for advancing our values.

USAID, U.S.

Agency for International Development.

You know when it was founded?

1961 by John F. Kennedy.

Why?

- In the middle of the Cold War.

- Height of the Cold War.

Because the Soviets were out there giving economic assistance to all kinds of countries in the developing world and he rightly said, "We got to compete with them."

- Yeah.

- And I could go through the list, VOA, Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, Radio Free Asia.

- I mean, actually, just this week, Radio Free Asia, because of the government shutdown, said that it will have to suspend its broadcasts.

- I didn't even see that.

That is such a tragedy.

- In the last 24 hours.

- We're not going to win this competition with the Chinese and the Russians if we unilaterally disarm.

- President Trump and Xi Jinping met this week in South Korea after weeks of tension over China's new restrictions on rare-earth minerals and Trump's threats of new tariffs.

The two countries finally have announced a framework for a potential trade deal.

How do you rate Trump's trip to Asia so far?

- Anytime the president of the United States travels to our allies and meets with them and engages with them, that's positive.

But I hope down the line, it's not just about commercial interests with the Chinese because we have security interests as well.

And I hope that we make clear over time that we're in Asia to stay.

We're not going to leave.

We're not going to pull back.

And we're going to keep the peace with respect to Taiwan.

- You write in your book that, "A comprehensive strategy for preventing war over Taiwan begins with reaffirming strategic ambiguity."

Going into the meetings with Xi Jinping, White House aides were reportedly concerned that Trump might waver in the context of his support for Taiwan.

What would be the consequence of Trump wavering in his posture for supporting Taiwan?

- It'd be a signal of weakness.

It'd be a signal of withdrawal.

And that sends the wrong message.

It's kind of like what happened with Russia and Ukraine, with Putin and Ukraine.

We don't care and so he decided he could go in and there would not be consequences.

And that would be a really bad outcome for our security interests and our economy.

And so it's much better to keep the strategy that we have in place, which is not to recognize Taiwan as an independent country.

Some want to do that here in the United States.

I just think that's imprudent.

That would precipitate and trigger more conflict.

- President Trump likes to make a deal.

He likes fast results.

Xi Jinping is playing a long game.

- Yes.

- When the U.S.

president, who is subject to term limits, is negotiating with a dictator who may be in power for decades, what should a president keep in mind?

- Well, the first thing I would say, if I could give advice to President Trump is, stop personalizing American foreign policy.

He talks too much about himself and trade deals, and, "I'm the trade guy."

He's supposed to represent America and American national interests.

Second, we're going to be in this competition with China and Russia for a long time.

That's my prediction in the book.

I hope I'm wrong, but I fear I'm right.

And if so, then it's better to lock things in with treaties, rules of the game, especially with our allies.

That was a great success we did during the Cold War.

We built allies, and by that unity, we defeated the Soviets because we were stronger than them militarily, and we outperformed them economically.

And I would like to see more of that kind of connective tissue built, not just a deal here, a deal there.

- You caution against overestimating the threat posed by China, arguing that it's not the existential threat that China hawks in the United States suggest.

And you write in your book, quote, "Chinese leaders have much more to gain from peace and stability and much more to lose from conflict and war than their counterparts in Moscow do today or had during the Cold War."

Unpack that for us.

- Well, this is probably one of the more controversial arguments in the book, so I'm glad you brought it up.

- Yeah.

- And I reserve the right to change my mind when the paperback comes out because I- - (laughs) And then you can come back on and explain why.

- I hope to do so.

But when I look at what they're doing, China has way more capabilities than the Russians do.

But they have a long game.

That's exactly the right strategy, the way to frame it.

They're thinking long-term all the time.

It's part of their culture.

And they don't want to burn it all down to create Marxism-Leninism in America and Europe.

They actually benefit from strong market economies like the United States, like Europe, because they're intertwined with them.

The Soviets never were.

They wanted to burn it all down.

That's a different strategy that we have to manage in a different way.

But the second is about intentions.

So Putin doesn't have the military or economic power of China or the United States, you know, by a long margin.

He's number three in this list, right?

- [Hoover] Yeah.

- And economically, he's number 11 on the list, just so we're clear.

You know, America and China, number one and two.

He's number 11.

But he's shown that the power that he has, even though it's more limited, he's willing to use to burn it all down.

- Yeah.

- I mean, annexation in Ukraine.

We fought a war in World War II to get rid of annexation.

And even during the Cold War, by and large, we didn't have a lot of annexation.

And now he's back, and he's doing that and he's challenging us to push back.

He's threatening our allies, right?

He's poking.

He's testing.

- Yeah, yeah.

- Lithuania, Poland.

That's way more aggressive than anything Xi Jinping is doing now.

- So what is at stake then?

What is the risk of underestimating Putin?

- War in Europe and getting dragged into a war, kind of like what happened in World War II where we thought, "Oh, what's going on there?

It doesn't really matter.

Oh, Hitler's doing that, doing this.

Stalin's doing that."

And we just thought we weren't gonna get dragged in and then we were, and that's what I worry about.

I worry that if Putin prevails in Ukraine, he won't stop in Ukraine and then we're gonna have these tests.

And I worry especially about places like Lithuania, where we have an allied- - Lithuania.

- obligation to defend Lithuania.

We could get dragged in if we let them go on.

- Last week, President Trump did something I know you agreed with.

He imposed, along with Europe, stiff sanctions on two oil companies- - [McFaul] Yes.

- that account for about half of Russian oil production.

How effective do you think these economic sanctions will be?

And do they require, will we get secondary sanctions that Zelensky has asked for, that the Congress has indicated it will move on?

- Right.

Well, first of all, yes.

Great achievement by those two companies.

I know those two companies well.

Should have been done three and a half years ago, in my view.

- Why wasn't it?

- You know, there was just a sense we couldn't go too fast.

We didn't want the price of gas to go too high in America.

I think- - But you would've advised a stronger response from the beginning?

- Yes, more weapons faster.

Better weapons faster.

More sanctions faster.

Better sanctions faster.

And had we done that, we might have been able to push this war to an end faster.

- Since Russia's invasion, the U.S.

and its allies have frozen almost $300 billion of assets- - Yes - which you have expressed support for seizing and transferring that money to Ukraine so the Ukrainians can use it.

There is a bipartisan bill in the Senate that would encourage the Trump administration to do this.

There has been some resistance, it seems, both from the Biden administration, but also from the Trump Administration, that disbanded a Justice Department task force to explore the targeting of Russian assets.

- Yeah.

- What is the holdup?

- Well, there's a couple of points of resistance.

One, seizing assets always makes people nervous about defending property rights and rule of law.

I get that, although we've worked with the best lawyers in America and Europe, and it is legal.

There's a basis for it.

This has happened before, so I don't think that's... - So the legality- - The legality.

- The opponents who suggest that it would be illegal, you're persuaded is not a viable argument.

- I don't, so I hope they finally figure it out.

There's been some progress, as you noted, and I'm cautiously optimistic it'll finally get done.

- President Trump has backed off plans to meet with Putin.

Last month, after Russian drones crossed into Polish airspace you wrote, "Trump should finally realize that Putin is mocking him.

Putin is making Trump look weak."

Do you think Trump's finally gotten the memo?

Do you think the President understands more what he's dealing with?

- Well, I haven't spoken to him personally about it, so I don't know for sure, but what he says publicly- - Suggests a change of posture.

- very different.

You know, let's remember, for about a decade, Putin could do no wrong for President Trump and even before he was president.

You know, he's inconsistent on a lot of things.

He was very consistent about, Putin's a good guy, overestimated, all that stuff.

And famously in Helsinki, their summit in 2018, he said, "I believe Putin, I don't believe the CIA," and the world was shocked.

This feels different.

- So does this posture change, does it feel different enough that there might be more movements on sanctions, there might be movements on seizing assets, there might be movements that actually would meaningfully force Putin to the table?

- I hope so, I hope so, but not yet.

- You're suspending disbelief.

- But not yet.

I mean, it's easy to talk tough.

It's harder to act tough, but I like what he's saying.

And now I would like to see him back up the tough talk with real action.

- So just this week, President Zelensky said he's open to peace talks.

He said once again he would not cede any Ukrainian territory.

Russia has never been kind to its leaders who have been blamed for losing conflicts.

- Yeah.

- What does negotiating with Putin, in order to end the Ukraine war, need to take into consideration given that he cannot be seen as weaker or having lost?

- Yeah, yeah, that's a great question, and I don't have a great answer.

I'd say a couple of things.

So first, Putin did overreach going into Ukraine.

This is a disaster for their economy.

He's just slaughtered some of the young people, and they need all those young people.

He didn't need to do this.

And a different strategy 25 years ago, had Russia remained quasi-democratic and integrated into Europe, they could be one of the most important countries in the world right now.

So his autocracy at home and imperialism abroad has set them back decades and that's just tragic for Russia.

- Is there any way to frame or to negotiate with Putin in a way that would save face?

- Yes.

Yeah, I do think there is.

And you hinted at it talking about Zelensky.

So President Zelensky, somebody I know and deeply respect and admire, he will never recognize annexation.

If he did that, he would be ousted.

There could be a coup d'etat.

But what he could do, delicately, is say, "We will only pursue reunification through peaceful means."

And then do a deal, wherever the border is, with Putin to say, "That's the deal."

That's kind of a North Korea South Korea outcome.

- There is no reporting that suggests Putin is in any mood to begin to negotiate.

- Correct, because he's still achieving limited success on the battlefield.

And I just was talking to some Ukrainian warriors last week here in America.

And publicly, of course, they talk, you know, in very courageous ways.

Privately, they'll report that they're losing territory, little bits and pieces, not big swaths, and it's costing thousands and thousands of Russian soldiers every day.

But as it keeps creeping, Putin, he's waiting for us to become disinterested.

He thinks that he has a longer attention span, he cares more.

In fact, the last week I was a U.S.

Ambassador, in 2014, right before he started the first war in Ukraine, I met with one of his most senior officials at the time, and we were talking about exactly this question.

He said, "Mike, there are two things that you need to know about us versus you."

He said, "One, we care a lot more about Ukraine than you and Americans do.

And two, we have longer attention spans than you Americans."

And I think about that every single day.

I hope he's wrong, but some days, I fear he might be right.

- But is stopping these incremental wins the thing that will get Putin to the table?

- Yes, I do.

I think it is.

And it's not even about his intentions.

It's about his capabilities.

We need to deny him the capability to continue to fight the war and then once you deny him that, then whether he wants to conquer all of Donbas or not doesn't matter.

He won't have the fighting force to do it.

- Do we have it within our means to support the Ukrainians?

And by we, I mean the United States, NATO, our allies in Europe, to deny him the capability of continuing to fight in Ukraine?

- I do.

I think we do, I think we do.

Both weapons, sanctions, economic support, and even just signaling that we're going to be there for the long haul would be a positive signal.

You know, the President, finally he sanctioned two companies.

I give him credit for that.

But he's wavered on what he thinks about Ukraine.

He gives very mixed signals.

And, you know, sometimes he says he's just going to walk away, you know?

He's threatened that a few times.

And that's what the Russians are counting on, and that's why he has to signal, "We're gonna be in it for the long haul."

And I think that would help to create the permissive conditions for negotiations about a ceasefire.

- In 1990, as the Soviet Union was coming apart, Russia scholar Richard Pipes was on the original "Firing Line" with William F. Buckley, Jr.

- Oh, wow.

- And they discussed his warning about Russia's global ambition.

Take a look at what he said then.

- Has the end of Bolshevik ideology signified a termination of an appetite to dominate the world on behalf of the proletarian revolution?

- In this particular form, yes, but even before Gorbachev, certainly under Stalin and his successors, the animating spirit behind the Russian global expansionism and global threats was chauvinism and xenophobia and not communism.

- And how would we most prudently go hard against that possibility?

- Well, there's very little we can do, except for one thing, not disarm ourselves.

- [Buckley] Mm-hmm.

- If we start really cutting back on our armaments production, if we really break up NATO, all of this prematurely, then we may be caught with a very unpleasant surprise so I think we have to keep all of this in place.

- I mean, it- - That's great.

Thanks for playing that.

- It seems like he's been proved right.

I mean- - Absolutely.

And thank God people listened to him about not pulling down NATO.

And thank goodness other advisers to Democrats and Republicans expanded NATO.

NATO has helped to keep the peace in Europe.

Russia and the Soviet Union have never attacked a NATO country.

And had we expanded faster, in my view, it would be a more secure place.

- The last time you were on this program in 2022, you said of your friend, Alexei Navalny, that his first job right now was to stay alive.

- Yeah.

I forgot I said that.

- Since we last spoke, he was, of course, murdered by Putin in captivity, in prison.

And in an obituary that you wrote entitled, "My Fearless Friend," you wrote, "It seemed to me his deepest anxiety was not about enduring torture in Putin's gulag or even facing death, but about being an absentee father and a husband."

- [McFaul] Yeah.

- Where'd his bravery come from?

(McFaul sighs) - I don't know.

He was a brave man.

And you know, I saw his wife, actually, the night before he was killed.

We were in Munich together.

And she was in the best mood I'd ever seen her.

Yulia is her name.

And I didn't know at the time, but they were on the verge of a deal to get him out and they were negotiating with it.

And I think now, in retrospect, we now know that Putin just couldn't take that, he couldn't.

The thought of Navalny being free again, he just couldn't take it and he killed him.

But I think he made a decision, and he gave the ultimate sacrifice, that he was a patriot.

I mean, that's the title of his book.

And he doesn't think that Putin was a patriot.

He thought there was a better way for his country and for his people to exist in this world.

He didn't want to be the imperialist that Richard Pipes was just talking about.

And he would always say, "I'm just as Russian as Putin."

But we lost a great leader in him, and nobody has really filled the void so far.

- You write, "I don't know when, but I'm confident Navalny's idea of freedom will outlive Putin's ideas of tyranny."

Are you still optimistic?

- I am.

I think in the fight between autocrats and democrats, we have more power, the free people of the world, military power.

We got better economic power, and our ideas are better.

Freedom is better than dictatorship.

Democracy is better than autocracy.

And you know what, most people in the world agree with that.

That's not an American, arrogant, imperial thing to say.

The data is overwhelming, that when you ask people, "Should a bunch of guys who claim to represent God," that's the Iranian mullahs, "choose your leaders, or should a communist party, or should a soldier, or should a dictator like Putin?"

Vast majorities of people all over the planet would prefer to elect their own leaders.

That's the audacious claim that Alexei Navalny had for his people.

And I think it's going to be a fight, there's going to be a long struggle.

I hope it's not as long as the Cold War was, but I'd much rather be on the side of the democrats than the autocrats.

- Ambassador Mike McFaul, thank you for joining me at "Firing Line."

- Thanks for having me.

- [Announcer] "Firing Line with Margaret Hoover" is made possible in part by Robert Granieri, The Tepper Foundation, Vanessa and Henry Cornell, The Fairweather Foundation, Pritzker Military Foundation, Cliff and Laurel Asness, and by the following.

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